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Abstract
Collective behavior in online social media and networks is known to be capable of generating
non-intuitive dynamics associated with crowd wisdom and herd behaviour. Even though these
topics have been well-studied in social science, the explosive growth of Internet computing and
e-commerce makes urgent to understand their effects within the digital society. In this work
we explore how the stochasticity introduced by social diversity can help agents involved in a
inference process to improve their collective performance. Our results show how social diversity
can reduce the undesirable effects of information cascades, in which rational agents choose to
ignore personal knowledge in order to follow a predominant social behaviour. Situations where
social diversity is never desirable are also distinguished, and consequences of these findings for
engineering and social scenarios are discussed.
1 Introduction
The high interconnectedness enabled by communication technologies and online media is progres-
sively increasing the complexity of our aggregated social behaviour [1]. In fact, these complex
dynamics were dramatically illustrated by the failure of our prediction tools in the forecast of recent
political events, including the Brexit referendum and the latest US presidential election. A key open
challenge is to clarify how the large amount of information that is constantly exchanged among
individuals affects their decisions.
Fascinating dynamics take place when social agents engage in sequencial decision-making. For
example, most people nowadays use the Internet to check other people’s recommendations prior to
make decisions, which enable more informed decisions thanks to the inclusion of evidence from pre-
vious experiences. Subsequent decisions are, however, heavily influenced by earlier agents, allowing
misinformation or fake news to be reinforced and spread across the social network. These non-trivial
social learning dynamics are known to play a critical role in a number of key social phenomena,
e.g., in the adoption or rejection of new technology, and in the formation of political opinions [2,3].
Moreover, social learning also plays a key role in the context of e-commerce and digital society, e.g.,
in recommendation systems of online stores where users access opinions of previous customers while
choosing their products [4, 5]. This is also the case in the emergence of viral media contents in
various Internet portals, which are based on sequential actions of like or dislike.
A deep understanding of social learning dynamics is crucial for enabling robust platform design
against fake news and data falsification, which is an urgent need in our modern networked society.
As a matter of fact, digital misinformation was listed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) as one
of the main threats to our modern society [6].
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Social learning have been thoughtfully studied since the 90’s by researchers from economics and
social sciences [7–9] (for modern reviews see [2, 3]). These studies have shown that social learning
is driven by two competing mechanisms. In one hand, the well-known crowd wisdom improve the
decision-making capabilities of agents within large networks, as more information becomes available
to latter agents in the decision sequence. The accumulation of social experience can, on the other
hand, overload agents and generate information cascades, which pushes them to ignore their private
knowledge and to adopt a predominant social behaviour. Interestingly, it has been shown that
the combination of these two mechanisms can serve to provide network resilience against data
falsification attacks [10, 11], pointing out promising possibilities for the design of resilient social
learning platforms.
Motivated by the benefits that diversity can provide in biological and social systems [12, 13], in
this work we study how social diversity affects the learning rate in a social learning scenario. For this,
we consider a network of rational agents that have diverse preferences and prior information, having
some similarities to the works reported in [14,15]. Using a communication theoretical interpretation
of this scenario, we show that social diversity is equivalent to additive noise in a communication
channel —which one would expect to be detrimental for the learning process. Surprisingly, our
findings show that social diversity can help to avoid information cascades, introducing important
improvements in the asymptotic learning performance.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Sections 2 introduces the considered social
learning scenario, and develops our definition of social diversity. Section 3 defines information
cascades, and characterize theoretically their behaviour with respect to social diversity. Section 4
presents numerical evaluations that verify the theoretical results, and finally Section 5 summarizes
our main conclusions.
Notation: uppercase letters X are used to denote random variables and lowercase x realiza-
tions of them, while boldface letters X and x represent vectors. Also, Pw {X = x|Y = y} :=
P {X = x|Y = y,W = w} is used as a shorthand notation.
2 Social learning model
2.1 Preliminaries and basic assumptions
Let us consider a social network composed by N agents, who are engaged in a decision-making
process. In this process each agent need to make a decision between two options1, which could
correspond to a choice between two restaurants, two brands, or two political parties. It is assumed
that decisions occur sequentially, and are labeled according to the order in which they take place.
The decision of the n-th agent, denoted as Xn ∈ {0, 1}, is based on two sources of information
(see Figure 1): a private signal Sn ∈ S, which is a continuous or discrete random variable that
represents personal information that the n-th agent possesses, and social information given by the
decisions of the previous agents, denoted by Xn−1 := (X1, . . . , Xn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n−1.
All the agents are assumed to have equivalent observation capabilities, and therefore the private
signals Sn are identically distributed. These signals are affected by environment conditions, which for
simplicity are represented by a binary variable W . For the sake of tractability, we follow the existent
literature in assuming that the private signals Sn are conditionally independent given W , leaving
other cases for future work. The corresponding conditional probability distributions of Sn given
the event {W = w} are denoted by µw. We further assume that no realization of Sn is capable
of completely determining W , which is equivalent to the measure theoretic notion of absolute
continuity between µ0 and µ1 [16]. As a consequence of this assumption, the log-likelihood ratio
1Although generalizations for more than two options are possible, we focus in the case of binary decisions
for simplifying the presentation.
2
Figure 1: A social learning scenario, where an agent needs to make a decision (pin) based on personal
information coming from a private signal (Sn) and social information (X
n−1) coming from a social
network.
of these two distributionsµ1 and µ0 is well-defined and given by the logarithm of the corresponding
Radon-Nikodym derivative ΛS(s) = log
dµ1
dµ0
(s)2.
A strategy is a rule for generating a decision Xn based on Sn = s and X
n−1, i.e. a collection
of deterministic or random functions pin : S × {0, 1}n−1 → {0, 1} such that Xn = pin(Sn,Xn−1).
2.2 Bayesian strategy, agents’ preferences and prior information
Let us assume that the preferences of the n-th agent are encoded in an utility function un(x,w),
which determines the payoff that the agent receives when making the decision Xn = x under the
condition {W = w}. We consider rational agents that follow a Bayesian strategy, which seeks to
maximize their average payoff given by E
{
u(pin(Sn,X
n−1),W )
}
, with E {·} being the expected
value operator. It has been shown that the Bayesian strategy for the n-th agent can be expressed
succinctly as [4]
P
{
W = 1|Sn,Xn−1
}
P
{
W = 0|Sn,Xn−1
} Xn=0≶
Xn=1
eνn , (1)
where νn = log
un(0,0)−un(0,1)
un(1,1)−un(1,0) reflects the effect of the cost function. For considering agents with
diverse preferences, we assume that νi are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables.
Let us further consider the case where the agents have no absolute knowledge about the prior
distribution of W . Note that because W is binary, its distribution is completely determined by the
value of P {W = 1}. Following the framework of Bayesian inference [17], let us consider θn ∈ [0, 1]
to be a collection of i.i.d. random variables following a distribution fθ(θ) that reflects the state of
knowledge of the agents about P {W = 1}. In particular, if the agent has complete knowledge then
fθ(θ) is a delta centered in the true value of P {W = 1} and hence θn = P {W = 1} for all n, while
if agents has no information then fθ(θ) corresponds to an uniform distribution over [0, 1].
Noting that Xn−1 depends only on (S1, . . . , Sn−1), and therefore is conditionally independent
of Sn, a direct application of the Bayes rule on P
{
W = 1|Sn,Xn−1
}
and P
{
W = 0|Sn,Xn−1
}
2When Sn takes a discrete number of values then
dµ1
dµ0
(s) = P{Sn=s|W=1}P{Sn=s|W=0} , while if Sn is a continuous random
variable with conditional p.d.f. p(s|w) then dµ1dµ0 (s) =
p(s|w=1)
p(s|w=0) .
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shows that (1) can be re-written as
ΛS(Sn) + ΛXn−1(X
n−1)
Xn=0
≶
Xn=1
νn + log
θn
1− θn , (2)
where ΛS(Sn) and ΛXn−1(X
n−1) are the log-likelihood ratios of Sn and Xn−1, respectively. Note
that an efficient method for computing τn(X
n−1) has been reported in [10].
2.3 Communication theoretic interpretation
By using an adequate decision labeling, one can consider the event {Xn = W} to be more desirable
than {Xn 6= W}, or equivalently, that un(1, 1) ≥ un(1, 0) and un(0, 0) ≥ un(0, 1). The Bayesian
strategy is, hence, to choose Xn as similar to W as possible using the information provided by Sn
and Xn−1. Therefore, the decisions pin(Sn,Xn−1) = Xn can be considered to be noisy estimations
of W .
To further explore this perspective, let us re-formulate (2) as
ΛS(Sn) + ξn
Xn=0
≶
Xn=1
τn(X
n−1) , (3)
where ξn := log(1−θn)/θn−νn and τn(Xn−1) := −ΛXn−1(Xn−1). The above can be understood as
a classic signal decoder within communication theory [4, Section IV], where ΛS(Sn) is the decision
signal and ξn is additive noise. Moreover, τn(X
n−1 is a decision threshold that establishes the
decoding rule based on a Vonoroi tessellation that divides R in two semi-open intervals given by
(−∞, τn(Xn−1)) and (τn(Xn−1),∞).
3 Avoiding information cascades via noise
3.1 Local and global information cascades
In general, the decision pin(Sn,X
n−1) is made based in complementary evidence provided by both
Xn−1 and Sn. The n-th agent is said to fall into a local information cascade when the information
conveyed by Sn is not included in the decision-making process due to a dominant influence of X
n−1.
The term “local” is used to emphasize that this event is related to the data fusion taking place at an
individual agent. The notion of local information cascade is formalized in the following definition,
which is based on the notion of conditional mutual information [18], denoted as I(·; ·|·).
Definition 1. The social information xn−1c ∈ {0, 1}n−1 generates a local information cascade
for the n-th agent if I(pin;Sn|Xn−1 = xn−1c ) = 0.
The above condition summarizes two possibilities: either pin(s,x
n−1
c ) is constant for all values
of s ∈ S, or there is still variability but this variability is conditionally independent of Sn (e.g. in
the case of stochastic strategies —not considered in this work). In both cases, the above definition
highlights the fact that the decision pin contains no unique information
3 coming from Sn when a
local cascade takes place .
Next we define global information cascades, which are avalanches of local information cascades
that affect all the agents after their ignition.
Definition 2. The social information vector xn−1c ∈ {0, 1}n−1 triggers a global information
cascade if I(pim : Sm|Xn−1 = xn−1c ) = 0 holds for all m ≥ n.
The relationship between local and global information cascades is explored in the next section
(c.f. Proposition 1).
3For a rigorous definition of unique information in Markov chains c.f. [19].
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3.2 The effect of social diversity over information cascades
Let us first introduce Fw(z) = Pw {ΛS(Sn) + ξn ≤ z} as a shorthand notation for the cumulative
distribution function of ΛS(Sn) + ξn conditioned on the event {W = w}. Note that, thank to
the fact that ΛS(S1) and ξ1 are independent random variables, one can compute Fw(·) as the
convolution of their density functions.
Lemma 1. The conditional statistics of pin given X
n−1 are defined by
Pw
{
pin = 0|Xn−1 = xn−1
}
= Fw(τn(x
n−1)). (4)
Proof. A direct calculation shows that
Pw {pi1(S1) = 0} = Pw {ΛS(S1) + ξ1 < 0} = Fw(0).
Following a similar rationale, one can find that
Pw
{
pin = 0|Xn−1 = xn−1
}
=
∫
S
Pw
{
pin(s,x
n−1) = 0|Sn = s
}
µw(s)ds
=
∫
S
1
{
pin(s,x
n−1) = 0
}
µw(s)ds
= Pw
{
ΛS(s) + ξn < τn(x
n−1)
}
= Fw(τn(x
n−1)) .
Above, the first equality is a consequence of the fact that Sn is conditionally independent of
Xn−1 given W = w, while the second equality is a consequence that pin is a deterministic
function of Xn−1 and Sn, and hence becomes conditionally independent of W .
Next, using Lemma 1, one can show that τn is an effective summary of the information provided
by Xn−1 that is relevant for generating the decision pin.
Lemma 2. The variables Xn−1 → τn → pin form a Markov Chain, i.e. τn is a sufficient
statistic of Xn−1 for predicting the decision pin.
Proof. Using (4), one can find that
Pw
{
pin = 0|τn,Xn−1
}
= Fw(τn) = Pw {pin = 0|τn} , (5)
and therefore the conditional independency of pin and X
n−1 given τn is clear.
We now present a proposition that clarifies the relationship between local and global information
cascades. This result extends [4, Theorem 1] to the current scenario.
Proposition 1. Each local information cascade triggers a global information cascade over the
social network.
Proof. Letus first note that
τn+1(X
n)− τn(Xn−1) =ΛXn−1(Xn−1)− ΛXn(Xn)
=− ΛXn|Xn−1(Xn|Xn−1) , (6)
where the conditional log-likelihood is given by
ΛXn|Xn−1(Xn|Xn−1) = log
P1
{
Xn|Xn−1
}
P0
{
Xn|Xn−1
} .
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Let us consider xn−1c ∈ {0, 1}n−1 such that it produce a local cascade in the n-th node.
As Bayesian strategies are deterministic, local information cascades corresponds to the events
where pin is fully determined by X
n−1, i.e. when the probability of the event {pin = 0|Xn−1 =
xn−1c } = {Xn = 0|Xn−1 = xn−1c } is either 0 or 1. This, in turn, implies that ΛXn|Xn−1(Xn|xn−1c ) =
0 almost surely, and therefore, conditioned on the event {Xn−1 = xn−1c } one has that
τm(X
m) = τn(x
n−1
c ) for all m ≥ n. (7)
Finally, by using (4), one can show that
Pw
{
pim = 0|Xm,Xn−1 = xn−1c
}
= Fw(τm(X
m)) = Fw(x
n−1
c ) (8)
Therefore, Pw{pim = 0|Xn−1 = xn−1c , Xn, . . . , Xm} is also either zero or one, showing that the
m-th agent also is affected by a local information cascade.
Let us now introduce Us = ess sup ΛS(Sn), Uξn = ess sup ξn, Ls = ess inf ΛS(Sn) and Lξn =
ess inf ξn as shorthand notations for the essential supermum and infimum of ΛS(Sn) and ξn
4. In
particular, Us and Ls correspond to the signals within S that most strongly support the hypothesis
{W = 1} and {W = 0}, respectively. If one of these quantities diverge, this implies that there are
signals s ∈ S that provide overwhelming evidence in favour of one of the competing hypotheses.
On the other hand, if Us and Ls are both finite then the agents are said to have bounded beliefs [3].
Similarly, when both Uξ and Lξ are finite we say agents have bounded diversity, which implies that
the diversity among priors and cost functions is not too high. Using this notions, we present the
main result of this work.
Theorem 1. Local information cascades cannot take place when agents have either unbounded
beliefs or unbounded diversity.
Proof. Note first that, due to the independency between ΛS(Sn) and ξn, one has that
Utotal := ess sup {ΛS(Sn) + ξn} = Us + Uξ, (9)
Ltotal := ess inf {ΛS(Sn) + ξn} = Ls + Lξ. (10)
From this, Utotal and Ltotal are unbounded if and only the agents have unbounded beliefs or
unbounded diversity.
From Lemma 1, it is clear that pin is fully determined by x
n−1 ∈ {0, 1}n−1 if and only if
τn(x
n−1) is such that Fw(τn(xn−1)) is zero or 1 for w ∈ {0, 1}. Because of the definition of Fw,
this happens whenever τn(X
n−1) /∈ [Ltotal, Utotal], proving the Proposition.
Information cascades are known to degrade the learning process, preventing the error rate of the
learning process P {pin 6= W} from converging to zero when the social network grows [4]. Therefore,
Theorem 1 reveals a non-intuitive value of social diversity, as it can safeguard social learning from
information cascades. In this way, social diversity can guarantee perfect social learning to happen
asymptotically, even when agents have bounded beliefs and are hence prone to herd behaviour [4].
However, this benefit usually comes at the price of a slower convergence, which can be detrimental
for the first agents of the decision sequence. This trade-off is explored in the next section.
4The essential supremum is the smallest upper bound of a random variable that holds almost surely, being
the natural measure-theoretic extension of the notion of supremum [20].
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4 Proof of concept
For illustrating the findings presented in Section 3, this section presents results of simulations of a
social network following the model presented in Section 2. We considered two scenarios: one where
Sn are binary variables that follow a binnary symmetric channel with P {Sn 6= w|W = w} = 1/4,
and other where Sn given {W = w} are Gaussian variables N(µw, σ2) with µw = (−1)1−w and
σ2 = 4. These two signal models were choosen because it is known that agent following binary
signals are strongly affected by information cascades, while agents following Gaussian signals are
not affected by them (for further details about these scenarios c.f. [4, Section VI]). For simpicity,
the social diversity has been modeled considering ξn to be i.i.d. following a Gaussian distribution
N(0, σ2ξ ), and hence σ
2
ξ quantifies the “diverstiy strength” of the social network. Each scenario was
simulated 105 realizations, and the statistics of the learning error rate, defined as P {pin 6= W} were
computed afterwards.
In agreement with Theorem 1, results confirm that social learning processes can be benefited
by social diversity. Figure 2a shows how the results of a collective inference carried out by agents
driven by binary private signals achieve better performance asymptotically. However, for some values
of social diversity the learning rate can be rather slow, making social learning not useful for small
social networks. In all the studied cases it was seen that social diversity degrades the performance
of the first agents in the decision sequence; however an adequate level of diversity can introduce
a fast learning rate. In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 2a for agents following Gaussian signals,
social diversity was found to be always detrimental in cases where agents have unbounded beliefs.
This confirms the fact that the benefits of social diversity is to avoid information cascades, which
are the main cause of poor performance of social learning in large networks [4].
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(a) Binary private signals
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Figure 2: Social learning rate for agents following binary or Gaussian private signals, under various
levels of social diversity (σ2ξ ). Social networks that follow binary signals are vulnerable to information
cascades, and hence a non-zero social diversity improve their asymptotic learning rate. In contrast,
social networks that follow Gaussian signals are inmune to information cascades, and hence social
diversity have a purely detrimental effect.
The different effect that social diversity has over agents located at different positions in the
inference process is further illustrated by Figure 3. We found that, for each agent, there exists an
optimal level of social diversity that reduces the effect of information cascades without introducing
too much noise. Agents located in the first places of the decision sequence are always affected
negatively by social diversity, and hence for them is optimal to have σ2ξ = 0.
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Figure 3: An optimal level of social diversity exist that can improve the social learning perfor-
mance of agents located late in the inference process. However desirable, this better performance
of late agents comes at the expense of a detrimental effect to the first agents.
5 Conclusion
This paper aims to undestand how social learning is affected when it is pursued by a diverse popu-
lation. Our scenario considered rational agents with heterogeneous preferences, as encoded by their
utility functions, and diverse prior information about the target variable. A communication theoretic
analysis showed that this kind of social diversity is equivalent to additive noise in a communication
channel. However, it was found that an unbounded social diversity prevent information cascades
and, hence, introduces important improvements into the asymptotic social learning rate that can
be achieved by a population. Social learning is, therefore, one of those rare cases where noise can
improve the overall performance.
To understand how can noise be beneficial, let us point out that rational social agents maximize
their individual performance while ignoring the consequences of their actions on the aggregated
behaviour. This selfish quality of the agent’s behavior makes their actions locally optimal while
being globaly suboptimal. In this context, the heterogeneity introduced by social diversity makes
the decisions of each agent less informative to others. This generates a reduced social pressure that,
in turn, prevents information cascades and herd behaviour, introducing great improvements in the
asymptotic social learning performance.
It is to be noted that the benefits of social diversity are only experienced by agents that are
prone to information cascades. Therefore, social diversity is not beneficial, e.g., for agents with
unbounded beliefs. However, in most applications agent’s beliefs are bounded, either because their
signals information content is limited or because the signals themselves are bounded. The latter is
the case in most engineering applications, e.g. in the scenario studied in [10].
Finally, it is important to remark that social diversity provides benefits to the latter agents in the
decision sequence, while degrading the performance of the first agents. Therefore, social diversity
might in general be detrimental for the performance of social learning in small networks.
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